Russia E-commerce Intelligence

On Sept 8 Kommersant reported that Andrey Pasynkov, head of the Marketplace Sellers Union (SPM), wrote to PM Mikhail Mishustin on Sept 3 asking the government to take control of Wildberries' delays in paying sellers for goods already sold, to task FAS with assessing the situation and the Federal Tax Service with accounting for sellers' cash-flow gaps. The settlement week in question runs July 27 to Aug 2: sellers filed withdrawal requests on Aug 17 and were due to be paid by Aug 26. An SPM survey of nearly 2,000 sellers found 95.6% had not received the payment; the association estimates one settlement week is worth around RUB 20bn. Wildberries (RWB) told Kommersant and RBC that most sellers were paid, but its Seller Balance service came under DDoS attack, so protective mechanisms temporarily suspend some outgoing payment operations; all funds are safe and are transferred once technical procedures are completed. Third-party monitoring shows most August payments actually took 10–14 days instead of the required five working days, and Market Papa's founder estimates 15–20% of affected suppliers may cut or pause new shipments. The government, FTS and FAS did not respond to requests for comment. What this means for Chinese sellers: WB payout cycles have stretched from a nominal five working days to 10–14 or more, so plan procurement and ad spend on a three-to-four-week cash cycle; do not run your working capital on WB alone — spread across Ozon and Yandex Market, and keep withdrawal requests and settlement-week records for any future claim.

On Sept 8 Artem Sokolov, president of the Russian Association of Internet Trade Companies (AKIT), said at the Eastern Economic Forum that despite frequent drone attacks neither Wildberries nor Ozon is seeing sellers migrate to alternative platforms; both remain habitual marketplaces for millions of buyers. He noted that M.Video saw a marked increase in new sellers late in the summer, attributing it to the platform's own evolution from a tool for extending its assortment into a universal marketplace rather than to external shocks. RBC recaps that attacks on marketplace logistics infrastructure began in mid-July against Wildberries facilities and hit Ozon warehouses from Aug 22, causing cargo losses and casualties. In late August Data Insight analyst Sergey Semko estimated Ozon's goods losses at over RUB 100bn and Wildberries' at RUB 517–580bn. Also in late August the government approved support for RWB-group companies and sole traders whose damage exceeded 5% of annual revenue: a one-year deferral on certain taxes, insurance contributions and advance payments due Aug 2026 – July 2027, repayable in equal parts over a further year. What this means for Chinese sellers: the official line is no outflow, but goods losses and warehouse disruption are real fulfillment risks — do not park all inventory in one warehouse on one platform; FBS self-shipping and multi-platform selling remain the hedge. If your damage exceeded 5% of annual revenue, check whether you qualify for the late-August tax and contribution deferral.

On Sept 8 the Russian Transport Ministry, following a session of the commission preparing regular meetings of the Russian and Chinese heads of government, reported that seaborne freight between the two countries' ports reached 109.5m tonnes in H1 2026, up 19.2% year on year (196.75m tonnes for full-year 2025, +4.3%). Road freight volumes rose 35% in the first five months of 2026; the sides agreed to exchange an additional 65,000 transport permits each in 2026 and tentatively 138,850 each in 2027. Rail freight grew 6.3% in 2025 to 186.8m tonnes, and in May 2026 the two countries signed an agreement to build a second 1,435-mm-gauge main track on the Zabaikalsk–Manzhouli section, adding capacity for up to 11m tonnes by 2030. Kommersant and TASS reported the same figures. What this means for Chinese sellers: sea and road are the two main replenishment channels for cross-border stock; volumes and permit quotas expanding together should ease peak-season space tightness and make small-batch road top-ups more viable. But the 2027 quota is only tentative — do not book it as guaranteed capacity in long-term plans.

The Russian Transport Ministry said on Sept 8 that during the 2026 summer-autumn season Russian and Chinese airlines operate 309 flights per week between the two countries, versus 230 a year earlier (about +34%). In the first seven months of 2026 Russian airlines carried more than 1.3m passengers to China, up 50%. Transport Minister Andrey Nikitin earlier told TASS Russian carriers had increased flight frequency to China by more than 25% this summer to 146 flights; in 2025 Russian airlines' passenger traffic to China rose 27% to 1.6m. What this means for Chinese sellers: more passenger flights means more belly-hold capacity — good news for time-sensitive small replenishments (samples, scarce spare parts, seasonal new SKUs) as an emergency channel alongside sea and rail. But the ministry reports only passenger metrics and no separate belly-cargo capacity, so actual available cargo space must be confirmed with your forwarder.

On Sept 8 Deputy PM Alexander Novak said at a government meeting that FAS has opened 51 cases and issued 81 warnings over unjustified fuel price increases. He instructed agencies to work out agreements between the Energy Ministry and FAS with small refineries and independent fuel stations to regulate pricing, to tighten control over compliance with fuel labeling requirements for environmental classes K2, K3 and K4, and to continue building an information system for monitoring the fuel market. Context: after fuel shortages emerged in late May, some independent operators began raising pump prices; on Aug 31 Novak instructed the Energy Ministry and FAS to step up control over pricing at independent stations and suggested regions conclude price agreements. What this means for Chinese sellers: diesel and gasoline prices directly set the cost of line-haul and last-mile delivery in Russia; if tougher enforcement and price agreements hold retail fuel prices down, it helps stabilize fulfillment costs both via platform logistics and self-shipping. At the same time, labeling control for environmental classes K2–K4 is tightening, so sellers in auto parts and fuel additives should check certification and labeling requirements.

On Sept 8 Armenian Deputy Economy Minister Tigran Gabrielyan said Armenia has appealed the import restrictions Russia imposed on Armenian goods and hopes the obstacles will be removed through existing EAEU mechanisms; he said the barriers do not accord with the agreements and principles reached within the union and that Yerevan is actively using the available instruments. Kommersant notes that since May Russia has been rolling out import restrictions on Armenian flowers, certain alcohol items, vegetables and fruit, mineral water, and fish and fish products, justified by violations of relevant norms — friction that emerged against the backdrop of Armenia's parliamentary elections and its pro-European course. What this means for Chinese sellers: compliance-framed import restrictions are appearing inside the EAEU, meaning grey re-export and customs-clearance routes through member states including Armenia carry rising risk. Sellers who optimized customs schemes via intra-EAEU transfers should re-assess their compliance exposure and prefer routes with the clearest documentation chain.

On Sept 8 Autostat head Sergey Tselikov reported that 2,216 new passenger electric vehicles were sold in Russia in August, up 105% year on year (1,081 units a year earlier). The top six models were the Evolute I-Joy (619), Changan Qiyuan Q05 (524), UMO 5 (354), Toyota bZ3X (155), Avatr 11 (115) and Avatr 12 (114). The domestic Atom sold just 11 units in August and 40 since launch. Zeekr sold only 23 units across five models, down 91% from 275 a year earlier. Tselikov noted growth is driven by the most affordable models priced at RUB 2–3m. What this means for Chinese sellers: the base is still tiny (a little over two thousand cars a month), but nearly all the growth comes from Chinese brands and China-platform models, so aftermarket demand for chargers, floor mats, cabin accessories, window film and winter tires will grow with the fleet. Conversely, demand for premium Chinese marques such as Zeekr is contracting sharply — do not transplant Chinese price bands onto the Russian market unadjusted.

On Sept 8 GWM's exclusive Russian distributor, Great Wall Motor Rus, said the Avtotor plant in Kaliningrad has begun serial production of the body-on-frame Haval H9 SUV (Haval PRO line), adding that launching the flagship model strengthens the company on one of the group's key markets and continues its deepening localization course. Vehicles are currently assembled from welded and painted bodies, with the plant planning to increase the number of technological operations and the localization level. Russia-built H9s undergo full quality checks to GWM standards and carry the manufacturer's official warranty and after-sales support through the Haval PRO dealer network. After Kia, Hyundai and BMW left Russia, Avtotor switched to Chinese brands from 2022 and assembles passenger and commercial vehicles of BAIC, Kaiyi, SWM, Jetour and others. What this means for Chinese sellers: Chinese vehicles shifting from import to local assembly pulls demand for localized spare parts, oils, consumables and tuning; sellers in auto goods should prioritize models already assembled in Russia such as Haval, BAIC and Jetour. Localization also compresses the price gap that parallel imports relied on.

According to Bank of Russia data published Sept 8, the regulator bought RUB 5.9bn (about $68.14m) worth of yuan on the domestic market settled Sept 7, 2026; the operation settled Sept 4 was the same RUB 5.9bn. The central bank conducts FX purchase and sale operations on the Moscow Exchange's FX section using the yuan–ruble instrument. What this means for Chinese sellers: continuous, steady yuan purchases are an indirect indicator of the depth of the national-currency settlement channel — official yuan availability in Russia remains stable, which supports yuan-denominated cross-border settlement. But the operation size does not signal exchange-rate direction; still time conversions against the central bank's daily official rate.

On Sept 8 Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, at a briefing for Indian media ahead of the BRICS summit in New Delhi, said Russia is not seeking de-dollarization or getting rid of US dollars and is open to every acceptable payment method. He noted, however, that some countries use their national currencies as a tool of political pressure and impose sanctions on that basis, so if they do not let us use their money, we use our own; he reiterated that settling in national currencies is mutually beneficial. The 18th BRICS summit will be held in New Delhi on Sept 12–13. What this means for Chinese sellers: Moscow still officially backs national-currency settlement and the policy environment for the yuan in Russia–China trade is unchanged. But the statement that Russia is not pursuing de-dollarization means you should not expect a forced rejection of dollar channels; when choosing a repatriation route, the primary criteria remain whether the payment actually lands and whether the transaction can be closed on the books.

On Sept 8 exchange copper prices rose to $14,600 per tonne, an all-time high, reported the same day by Kommersant, TASS and Lenta.ru. Copper is a core raw material for home appliances, cables, chargers and electronics. What this means for Chinese sellers: record copper feeds through to factory costs for small appliances, power cords, data cables, chargers and lighting, so restocking quotes for autumn–winter 2026 may run above first-half levels. Lock in supplier price validity early and build a 3–5% raw-material buffer into your pricing model rather than raising prices mid-season.